IDF troops operating in the Gaza Strip recently discovered a Hamas manual for tunnel warfare, which describes in detail how to maneuver and fight in the dark underground spaces.
The manual, which was written in 2019, years before the Oct. 7 Hamas invasion, shows that the terror group was already planning for a fight against the IDF in Gaza, and was preparing to use the tunnels as a significant part of their strategy.
A copy of the manual was provided to the New York Times by the IDF. In an article about the manual, the Times said that "markings on the documents are consistent with other Hamas materials that have been made public or been examined by The Times."
The manual included instructions for fighters operating in the tunnels.
"While moving in the dark inside the tunnel, the fighter needs night-vision goggles equipped with infrared," the manual instructs.
Fighters are told to hold their rifles at shoulder height in an automatic setting. "This type of shooting is effective because the tunnel is narrow, so the shots are aimed at the kill zones in the upper part of the human body."
Hamas' tunnel network was well known to Israel before the Gaza war, however, the extent of the network and its sophistication has far exceeded what Israeli officials were aware of.
Practically every week, the IDF announces the discovery and destruction of an additional section of the massive tunnel network. Both the Bedouin Israeli Qaid Farhan al-Qadi, and the bodies of the six murdered hostages were found in underground tunnels in Rafah in southern Gaza.
Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar is believed to have spent most of the war hiding underground in the tunnel network, which at one point connected all of the Gaza Strip, from North to South.
In the manual, Hamas appears to make the tunnels the key part of its battlefield strategy against the IDF, envisioning underground fighting in the tunnels as the primary area of combat.
Tamir Hayman, a former head of Israel's military intelligence said, "Hamas's combat strategy is based on underground tactics. This is one of the primary reasons they have managed to withstand the IDF thus far."
However, it also appears the IDF has successfully shifted its own tactics such that Hamas was not able to use the tunnels as much as they anticipated. By refusing to directly enter the tunnels discovered in active combat areas, the IDF has prevented Hamas from turning them into places to ambush.
While Hamas continues to use the tunnels to harass Israeli soldiers, including staging successful "hit-and-run attacks" using hidden tunnel shafts, the expected underground battle has not happened.
Instead, the IDF has taken a slow, measured approach to identifying tunnels, using drones or dogs to search out tunnel segments, looking for booby traps and signs of hostages, and then destroying the segments after inspecting them for any useful intelligence information.
These destructions have also compromised Hamas' ability to use the tunnels as effectively as they previously envisioned.
Before Oct. 7, the IDF invested most of its anti-tunnel efforts into locating tunnels entering Israeli territory. The vast tunnel network within Gaza was not a priority, as commanders did not anticipate a large-scale ground campaign in the Strip.
The manual demonstrates that Hamas was planning for such a confrontation. It instructs fighters on how to hide tunnel shaft entrances, how to find the shafts using GPS, and how to move effectively once inside the tunnels.
As the army has uncovered the extent of the tunnel network, IDF officials have been surprised by the sophistication of parts of the tunnels. Clearly, much of the planning and preparation was done in anticipation of an Oct. 7-type event.
Earlier this year, the IDF located rooms which had been prepared for holding hostages. They found telecommunications systems to enable underground communication, including some connected to hospitals and U.N. facilities.
The sheer extent of the tunnel network has also slowed down IDF operations in the Strip. Daphné Richemond-Barak, a tunnel warfare expert at Reichman University in Israel, told the Times, "The tunnels impact the pace of the operations."
"You can't advance. You can't secure the terrain," she said, adding that the IDF is "dealing with two wars, one on the surface and one on the subsurface."
A letter from Yahya Sinwar to Mohammed Deif, written before the Oct. 7 attacks, indicates the extensive efforts and cost to prepare for the anticipated conflict. In the letter, Sinwar tells Deif, "the brigades will be given the money according to the level of importance and necessity."
Hamas dedicated most of its money to the tunnel system in northern Gaza and the Hamas stronghold city of Khan Younis, including installing blast doors meant to minimize the effectiveness of IDF bombs, and slow down Israeli troops entering the tunnels.
Israeli soldiers discovered the Hamas tunnel warfare manual in the Zeitoun neighborhood of Gaza City in November.
Republished with permission from All Israel News